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Robin Faichney
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 Posted: Sun Aug 24, 2008 3:52 pm Post subject: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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The big problem with consciousness is not what David Chalmers calls
the hard one -- which is not really a problem at all -- but the fact
that some people load it with so much significance. I know, I used to
be one of them. Defending my idea of consciousness against the
onslaught of those who wanted to reduce it to nothing was my main
motivation for many years. Daniel Dennett was my ideological arch
enemy.
Eventually, though, I realised that what's special about consciousness
-- and it is special -- is all in the experience, the practice, and
not in the analysis, the theory. Well, that's not entirely true,
because some theoretical aspects are pretty bloody wonderful, such as
the sheer fact that the universe evolved self-consciousness, which is
even more amazing than the appearance of life, when you think about
it. But that kind of wonder isn't dissipated by analysis, it's
enhanced by it.
Whether you're into consciousness raising via the arts, or meditation,
or just appreciate the wonder of another person being as fully aware
of you as you are of them, that's all practice, not theory, and
nothing theoretical can threaten it. You have no reason to feel
anxious at the prospect of consciousness being "explained away".
Though some people seem to feel that threatens their very identity! If
I said that can be explained too, would that strike you as a good or a
bad thing? I guess that depends on whether you're one of them.
Modeling and Intentionality, Message-ID
<lbgqa4lomp118qtbk5qfso1rh1n2kbn3eo@4ax.com>, contains 90% of my main
ideas on consciousness. Consciousness and intentionality are VERY
closely linked. If what follows isn't enough for you, AND you're
sufficiently interested (I know many won't be), you might read that or
visit my website, <http://www.dalbrack.org>.
To believe something to be conscious is to be willing to empathise
with it, or at least to believe that empathy with it is possible, to
however slight an extent. And empathy is about modeling: we all model
our environments, each other and ourselves, and to empathise with
someone is to use your own self-model, parameterised with any
perceived difference, to model them.
The philosophical zombie is just the concept of a person with whom you
believe no empathy whatsoever is possible: what's missing appears to
be that with which we empathise, but it's not a really a thing, and
not really in other people. What's missing from the zombie is our
willingness to empathise with him or her.
When you think of yourself as conscious, you have an image or symbol
of consciousness in your mind, which is very closely connected with
your self-model: you're not literally aware of being aware, that would
be like being able to see your eyes directly, without using a mirror.
The concept of consciousness is just a particular mental image, it's
experiencing reality that's truely amazing, if you pay enough
attention to it.
Of course there's a lot more to be said about consciousness than that.
Writing that celebrates sheer experience is fairly easily found,
whereas I'm more into conceptual analysis, in my writing, as you can
see on my new website...
--
<http://www.dalbrack.org/>
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information |
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Wolf Kirchmeir
Guest
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| Posted: Tue Aug 26, 2008 6:30 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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Robin Faichney wrote:
[...]
| Quote: | Of course there's a lot more to be said about consciousness than that.
Writing that celebrates sheer experience is fairly easily found,
whereas I'm more into conceptual analysis, in my writing, as you can
see on my new website...
|
Insofar as your ideas make sense, they are on the level of
psychology/psychiatry, ie, of symbolic behaviours such as language, art,
social gestures, etc. They don't apply to system architecture,
circuitry, etc.
Despite your belief to the contrary, there is a hard problem of
consciousness: just what features of system functioning, and at what
level(s), account for awareness, consciousness, and self-consciousness?
To put it another way: to observe and describe the fact that people are
able to empathise (to use your term) with dead ancestors via preserved
letters tells us something about consciousness as a
phenomenon/experience. The only help this is to a designer of conscious
AI systems is that it provides a test: if the conscious AI system can
read preserved letters, and produces the same kinds of language (for
example) as a human would, then presumably it's conscious. "Empathy", as
you describe it, is the behaviour of imagining what it feels like to be
someone/something else - even a thing that isn't conscious.
BTW, your identification of consciousness and empathy implies that
psychopaths are not conscious. Your concept needs more work.
HTH
--
wolf k. |
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Robin Faichney
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 9:21 am Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:30:09 -0400, Wolf Kirchmeir
<wolfkir@sympatico.ca> wrote:
| Quote: | Robin Faichney wrote:
[...]
Of course there's a lot more to be said about consciousness than that.
Writing that celebrates sheer experience is fairly easily found,
whereas I'm more into conceptual analysis, in my writing, as you can
see on my new website...
Insofar as your ideas make sense, they are on the level of
psychology/psychiatry, ie, of symbolic behaviours such as language, art,
social gestures, etc. They don't apply to system architecture,
circuitry, etc.
Despite your belief to the contrary, there is a hard problem of
consciousness: just what features of system functioning, and at what
level(s), account for awareness, consciousness, and self-consciousness?
|
My contention is that awareness or consciousness is a subjective
attribution, that there is no truth about whether any entity is or is
not conscious, it's entirely a matter of opinion. That's important for
AI because it means that looking for a way to implement consciousness
as such is a waste of time. (Not that I believe many AI people are
actually doing that.)
Though I said "subjective" there, trying to make it as clear as
possible, in fact it's slightly more subtle than that, and the correct
word is "intersubjective". So it's not good enough to attribute
consciousness on a whim, but the conditions to be satisfied are not
objective ones, concerning only the artificial system. They concern
the relationship between that system and the potential attributor,
specifically that the system be perceivable as essentially similar to
the attributor. So that's what AI people have to aim at.
| Quote: | To put it another way: to observe and describe the fact that people are
able to empathise (to use your term) with dead ancestors via preserved
letters tells us something about consciousness as a
phenomenon/experience. The only help this is to a designer of conscious
AI systems is that it provides a test: if the conscious AI system can
read preserved letters, and produces the same kinds of language (for
example) as a human would, then presumably it's conscious. "Empathy", as
you describe it, is the behaviour of imagining what it feels like to be
someone/something else - even a thing that isn't conscious.
BTW, your identification of consciousness and empathy implies that
psychopaths are not conscious. Your concept needs more work.
|
No, I'm sorry I didn't make that clear enough, but you've got it the
wrong way around. The attribution of consciousness requires empathy on
the part of the attributor, not the attributee. Or at least the
attributor needs to believe that there is some possibility of empathy
with the attributee, whether they actually empathise or not. That's
the essential similarity mentioned above. If I believe that there is
absolutely no possibility of empathy with a particular thing, as in
the case of a rock, then I believe it's not conscious. To view
something as a potential recipient of empathy is to see it as "one of
us", a member of the club of sentient entities.
In brief, it's all about attribution.
--
<http://www.dalbrack.org/>
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information |
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Alpha
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 2:47 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Aug 27, 2:02 am, Robin Faichney <ro...@robinfaichney.invalid>
wrote:
<snip>
| Quote: | To view
something as a potential recipient of empathy is to see it as "one of
us", a member of the club of sentient entities.
|
And that would mean, living entities - for life and consciousness are
intertwinned. Autopoetic systems etc. See Evan Thompson's work: Mind
in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind |
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Alpha
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 2:49 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Aug 27, 7:12 am, Wolf Kirchmeir <wolf...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
| Quote: | Robin Faichney wrote:
[...]
In brief, it's all about attribution.
a) you didn't show that you had snipped part of my post.
b) your further explanation makes it clearer than ever that your are
talking about words and their meanings. ("ie, of symbolic behaviours
such as language, art, social gestures, etc.")
What you say isn't the problem, it's your apparent claim that you've
resolved the problem of consciousness. In essence, you've dismissed it,
and recast it as semantics.
FWIW, I don't think that "intelligence" entails consciousness of any kind..
|
Well, this was my contention to Don some time ago. One is all about
phenomenal experience and the other (intelligence) is operational. One
can have an intelligent agent W/O consciousness. Although, I think
the function of consciousness and the experience it enables informd
the functions of intelligence in many areas.
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Kenneth
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 4:47 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Aug 27, 2:02 am, Robin Faichney <ro...@robinfaichney.invalid>
wrote:
| Quote: | On Tue, 26 Aug 2008 09:30:09 -0400, Wolf Kirchmeir
wolf...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
Robin Faichney wrote:
[...]
Of course there's a lot more to be said about consciousness than that.
Writing that celebrates sheer experience is fairly easily found,
whereas I'm more into conceptual analysis, in my writing, as you can
see on my new website...
Insofar as your ideas make sense, they are on the level of
psychology/psychiatry, ie, of symbolic behaviours such as language, art,
social gestures, etc. They don't apply to system architecture,
circuitry, etc.
Despite your belief to the contrary, there is a hard problem of
consciousness: just what features of system functioning, and at what
level(s), account for awareness, consciousness, and self-consciousness?
My contention is that awareness or consciousness is a subjective
attribution, that there is no truth about whether any entity is or is
not conscious, it's entirely a matter of opinion. That's important for
AI because it means that looking for a way to implement consciousness
as such is a waste of time. (Not that I believe many AI people are
actually doing that.)
Though I said "subjective" there, trying to make it as clear as
possible, in fact it's slightly more subtle than that, and the correct
word is "intersubjective". So it's not good enough to attribute
consciousness on a whim, but the conditions to be satisfied are not
objective ones, concerning only the artificial system. They concern
the relationship between that system and the potential attributor,
specifically that the system be perceivable as essentially similar to
the attributor. So that's what AI people have to aim at.
To put it another way: to observe and describe the fact that people are
able to empathise (to use your term) with dead ancestors via preserved
letters tells us something about consciousness as a
phenomenon/experience. The only help this is to a designer of conscious
AI systems is that it provides a test: if the conscious AI system can
read preserved letters, and produces the same kinds of language (for
example) as a human would, then presumably it's conscious. "Empathy", as
you describe it, is the behaviour of imagining what it feels like to be
someone/something else - even a thing that isn't conscious.
BTW, your identification of consciousness and empathy implies that
psychopaths are not conscious. Your concept needs more work.
No, I'm sorry I didn't make that clear enough, but you've got it the
wrong way around. The attribution of consciousness requires empathy on
the part of the attributor, not the attributee. Or at least the
attributor needs to believe that there is some possibility of empathy
with the attributee, whether they actually empathise or not. That's
the essential similarity mentioned above. If I believe that there is
absolutely no possibility of empathy with a particular thing, as in
the case of a rock, then I believe it's not conscious. To view
something as a potential recipient of empathy is to see it as "one of
us", a member of the club of sentient entities.
In brief, it's all about attribution.
--
http://www.dalbrack.org/
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information
|
So you're saying if I'm a crazy person or a person who believes that
consciousness permeates the universe, then I could believe a rock to
be conscious, and that makes the rock conscious? Or are you saying
only if BOTH the rock and I believe each other to be conscious, then
we are both conscious? So if two robots believe each other to be
conscious then they are both conscious, but if one robot believes the
other to be conscious, but the other robot does not return the
sentiment, then neither of them is conscious?
Hmmm...doesn't sound right. Sounds like you're redefining it. I
believe I am conscious regardless of what someone else thinks, and
that others are conscious regardless of what I think.
I do, however, agree that consciousness is a non-issue at this point
for AI. Eventually though, it may become a topic of hot debate... |
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Alpha
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 5:30 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Aug 27, 9:17 am, Robin Faichney <ro...@robinfaichney.invalid>
wrote:
| Quote: | On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 07:49:37 -0700 (PDT), Alpha
omegazero2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Aug 27, 7:12 am, Wolf Kirchmeir <wolf...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
[...]
FWIW, I don't think that "intelligence" entails consciousness of any kind.
Well, this was my contention to Don some time ago. One is all about
phenomenal experience and the other (intelligence) is operational. One
can have an intelligent agent W/O consciousness. Although, I think
the function of consciousness and the experience it enables informd
the functions of intelligence in many areas.
How would you describe "the function of consciousness"?
|
Through is, or with it, we are able to experience. It generates or
enables phenomenal awareness. There is also the notion of the content
of consciousness, which is sometimes confused with consciousness per
se. Further, consciousness is where/when (within notions of temporal
consciousness) all relevent aspects of phenomenal awareness "come
together" (as in neural-assembly synchrony - see Thompson's and
Varela's work for example). The binding of various sensorimotor
activities into an awarness of body in space-time, and an awarness of
thoughts and actions *in* time. The enactive approach etc.
| Quote: |
[...]
--
http://www.dalbrack.org/
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information |
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Alpha
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 5:32 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Aug 27, 9:21 am, Robin Faichney <ro...@robinfaichney.invalid>
wrote:
| Quote: | On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 07:47:53 -0700 (PDT), Alpha
omegazero2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Aug 27, 2:02 am, Robin Faichney <ro...@robinfaichney.invalid
wrote:
snip
To view
something as a potential recipient of empathy is to see it as "one of
us", a member of the club of sentient entities.
And that would mean, living entities - for life and consciousness are
intertwinned. Autopoetic systems etc. See Evan Thompson's work: Mind
in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind
It was ET who gave me the confidence to make empathy central. However,
empathy is where you find it, and though it obviously evolved and
developed in the context of life as we know it, there's no rule that
says it could not be extended to suitably designed artificial systems,
or extraterrestrials.
|
Yet there is no evidence yet that such a platform for consciousness is
possible; we have only life as a guide so far.
Theoretically perhaps; but there is much theory to be worked out yet;
how to design an autopoetic, self-organizing, self-sustaining entity
and all that.
| Quote: | --
http://www.dalbrack.org/
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information |
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Wolf Kirchmeir
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 7:12 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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Robin Faichney wrote:
[...]
| Quote: | In brief, it's all about attribution.
|
a) you didn't show that you had snipped part of my post.
b) your further explanation makes it clearer than ever that your are
talking about words and their meanings. ("ie, of symbolic behaviours
such as language, art, social gestures, etc.")
What you say isn't the problem, it's your apparent claim that you've
resolved the problem of consciousness. In essence, you've dismissed it,
and recast it as semantics.
FWIW, I don't think that "intelligence" entails consciousness of any kind.
HTH
--
wolf k. |
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Robin Faichney
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 9:14 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 10:12:09 -0400, Wolf Kirchmeir
<wolfkir@sympatico.ca> wrote:
| Quote: | Robin Faichney wrote:
[...]
In brief, it's all about attribution.
a) you didn't show that you had snipped part of my post.
|
I'm sorry, I didn't think "HTH" was significant.
| Quote: | b) your further explanation makes it clearer than ever that your are
talking about words and their meanings. ("ie, of symbolic behaviours
such as language, art, social gestures, etc.")
|
If you are saying that these are all irrelevant in AI, then I don't
know what to say to you. Except maybe: so what is relevant?
| Quote: | What you say isn't the problem, it's your apparent claim that you've
resolved the problem of consciousness. In essence, you've dismissed it,
and recast it as semantics.
|
I don't think I dismiss it then recast it. Rather, I analyse it then
dismiss it. I have no doubt that David Chalmers' concept of the "hard
problem of consciousness" is a pseudo-problem, because it implies that
consciousness has to be in some sense ontologically objective, while
it's not. (Or at least, there's no evidence that it is, and no need
for it to be so besides some people's intuitions.) And, of course,
what is not objectively real cannot be implemented. But it's difficult
to know what to say within the limitations of a usenet post that would
either convince people straight off, or spur them to make substantial
criticisms that could then be answered.
| Quote: | FWIW, I don't think that "intelligence" entails consciousness of any kind.
|
I couldn't agree more. But my assumption, perhaps erroneous, is that
part of the AI community is interested not just in intelligence as
such, but in artificial minds.
Left it in this time. 
--
<http://www.dalbrack.org/>
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information |
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Robin Faichney
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 9:17 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 07:49:37 -0700 (PDT), Alpha
<omegazero2003@yahoo.com> wrote:
| Quote: | On Aug 27, 7:12 am, Wolf Kirchmeir <wolf...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
[...]
FWIW, I don't think that "intelligence" entails consciousness of any kind.
Well, this was my contention to Don some time ago. One is all about
phenomenal experience and the other (intelligence) is operational. One
can have an intelligent agent W/O consciousness. Although, I think
the function of consciousness and the experience it enables informd
the functions of intelligence in many areas.
|
How would you describe "the function of consciousness"?
<http://www.dalbrack.org/>
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information |
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Robin Faichney
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 9:21 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 07:47:53 -0700 (PDT), Alpha
<omegazero2003@yahoo.com> wrote:
| Quote: | On Aug 27, 2:02 am, Robin Faichney <ro...@robinfaichney.invalid
wrote:
snip
To view
something as a potential recipient of empathy is to see it as "one of
us", a member of the club of sentient entities.
And that would mean, living entities - for life and consciousness are
intertwinned. Autopoetic systems etc. See Evan Thompson's work: Mind
in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind
|
It was ET who gave me the confidence to make empathy central. However,
empathy is where you find it, and though it obviously evolved and
developed in the context of life as we know it, there's no rule that
says it could not be extended to suitably designed artificial systems,
or extraterrestrials.
--
<http://www.dalbrack.org/>
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information |
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| Back to top |
Wolf Kirchmeir
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 10:22 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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Robin Faichney wrote:
| Quote: | On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 10:12:09 -0400, Wolf Kirchmeir
wolfkir@sympatico.ca> wrote:
Robin Faichney wrote:
[...]
In brief, it's all about attribution.
a) you didn't show that you had snipped part of my post.
I'm sorry, I didn't think "HTH" was significant.
|
Sorry, I was mistaken, had original draft in mind, which was somewhat
longer. 
--
wolf k. |
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Robin Faichney
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 10:48 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 10:30:45 -0700 (PDT), Alpha
<omegazero2003@yahoo.com> wrote:
| Quote: | On Aug 27, 9:17 am, Robin Faichney <ro...@robinfaichney.invalid
wrote:
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 07:49:37 -0700 (PDT), Alpha
omegazero2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Aug 27, 7:12 am, Wolf Kirchmeir <wolf...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
[...]
FWIW, I don't think that "intelligence" entails consciousness of any kind.
Well, this was my contention to Don some time ago. One is all about
phenomenal experience and the other (intelligence) is operational. One
can have an intelligent agent W/O consciousness. Although, I think
the function of consciousness and the experience it enables informd
the functions of intelligence in many areas.
How would you describe "the function of consciousness"?
Through is, or with it, we are able to experience. It generates or
enables phenomenal awareness. There is also the notion of the content
of consciousness, which is sometimes confused with consciousness per
se. Further, consciousness is where/when (within notions of temporal
consciousness) all relevent aspects of phenomenal awareness "come
together" (as in neural-assembly synchrony - see Thompson's and
Varela's work for example). The binding of various sensorimotor
activities into an awarness of body in space-time, and an awarness of
thoughts and actions *in* time. The enactive approach etc.
|
You suggested that consciousness/experience "inform the functions of
intelligence". I took that to mean that consciousness has an
externally (if indirectly) evident function by which we could
determine whether a given entity is conscious or not. None of the
"functions" you list there would be externally evident, as far as I
can see.
--
<http://www.dalbrack.org/>
Consciousness, Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information |
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Don Geddis
Guest
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| Posted: Wed Aug 27, 2008 11:08 pm Post subject: Re: Consciousness: what's the problem? |
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Alpha <omegazero2003@yahoo.com> wrote on Wed, 27 Aug 2008:
| Quote: | On Aug 27, 7:12 am, Wolf Kirchmeir <wolf...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
FWIW, I don't think that "intelligence" entails consciousness of any kind.
Well, this was my contention to Don some time ago. One is all about
phenomenal experience and the other (intelligence) is operational. One can
have an intelligent agent W/O consciousness.
|
The words are ill-enough defined, that it depends a little on what you
think each one means.
Consciousness is about self-awareness, a self-model, interior sensors,
memory, planning/imagination, etc. The entity needs to have a rich
symbolic representation of itself, and reason about its own past and future.
Intelligence, in a very narrow sense, can be about performance on puzzles.
Playing chess, completing analogies, extending numeric sequences, etc.
In that sense, of course: one could easily build an "intelligent" agent that
is not conscious. The chess system Deep Blue is almost certainly not
conscious in any interesting sense of the word. Some people may classify
Deep Blue as "intelligent", at least in a limited domain.
But if you're talking about _general_ intelligence, about a capacity to toss
a robot on Mars and have it do useful things in a new, unknown environment
.... well then, you can't build such a system without also (accidentally?)
creating consciousness at the same time. For robust behavior in new
environments, a system needs a strong sense of itself, and the effects of
its own actions upon the world. Which is where consciousness comes from.
The thing that's silly is the Chalmers idea of zombies: an entity that acts
_exactly_ like a human, but is missing some magic inner "spark" that is
consciousness. Those entities don't exist (even in theory). Human-level
intelligence implies consciousness.
-- Don
_______________________________________________________________________________
Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don@geddis.org
A bore is someone who persists in holding his own views after we have
enlightened him with ours. |
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